This study tests the hypotheses that games of strategy will be more prevalent in societies where political power is based on a "network strategy" and that network societies place more value on the enculturation of obedience in children. Both hypotheses are supported.

The present study investigates whether there is resilience variability following climate-related disasters in societies that are corporate-oriented, which promote participatory and inclusive structures, and exclusionary-oriented, which limit political authority and power. The findings offer modest support for social resilience theory that more flexible (i.e. more participatory) societies would be more resilient after a disaster than less flexible societies. Although only 5 of 14 correlations are significant, the direction is significant by a binomial sign test.

This article uses pre-defined criteria to sample 22 archaeological climate-related disasters from 9 distinct regions from eHRAF Archaeology. It quantitatively tests four hypotheses regarding change in conflict following climate-related disasters using multiple regression analyses and backwards stepwise regression. Findings demonstrate association between political strategy/authority decision making and degree of post climate disaster conflict.

In the present study, Peregrine tests two perspectives regarding social resilience to climate-related disasters: 1) that societies with more inclusive and participatory political structures (corporate political strategies) are more resilient to climate-related disasters, and 2) that societies with tighter adherence to social norms are more resilient to climate-related disasters. Results support the notion that societies with greater political participation are more socially resilient to catastrophic climate-related disasters. Because these results are justifiably generalizable across multiple historical and cultural contexts, Peregrine's findings are a useful contribution to aid in disaster response policy decision making.

The article tests theories that may explain why warfare frequency varies from society to society. The focus is on ecological problems, particularly different kinds of resource scarcity, but social and psychological theories are also tested with both bivariate and multivariate analyses. Because unpredictable disasters are such a strong predictor in nonstate societies, the authors theorize that war may mostly be caused by a fear of nature.

The author analyzes conditions that might favor social resilience during the Late Antique Little Ice Age (ca. 536-556 CE). The assumption is made that climatic conditions in the Northern Hemisphere during this period of time are very similar to those that would occur during a nuclear winter. These conditions include a drop in temperature and decreased solar radiation from volcanic eruptions. Measures for social resilience come from multiple variables for social change, which are tested against measures for type of political engagement. It is argued that broad political participation is correlated with resilience.

The authors construct a mathematical model from which they generate their main hypothesis that resource unpredictability should be associated with frequency of warfare. A cross-cultural test of this hypothesis was performed by Ember and Ember (1992). The authors critique these findings for state societies and test and alternate hypothesis for application to state societies.

This article discusses the reasons behind advances in craft specialization particularly why there is a relationship between advances in craft specialization and the emergence of powerful elites. Hypothesis tests focused on political centralization.

This paper reviews the results of the author's cross-cultural studies of war and aggression and their implications for prehistory.

This article stresses the use of multivariate analysis to study the emergence of states. The authors first discuss how social inequality, population density, and trade affect state development. Next, they turn to a time series regression to formally examine social stratification, urbanization, technological specialization as predictors of political integration. Finally, economic vulnerability and scalar stress are considered as possible underlying factors in the emergence of states.